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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Number 10 10(2)

MEMORANDUM FOR: G - Mr. Johnson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Caribbean Security Arrangements.

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DEFINITION UNDER
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I have received from USUN the following comments on the Caribbean Security Arrangements paper. As you will see, it is rather negative about trying to set up anything that goes beyond a strict construction of the understanding between the President and Khruschev -- that is, anything that goes beyond inspection directly related to the reintroduction of offensive weapons.

On the telephone this morning, USUN was somewhat less negative on the subject. They are now working on the problem some more, taking as the basic assumption that there ought to be some kind of Caribbean security system with a degree of mutuality built into the inspection arrangements.

MEMOIRS

Like UN working paper which we have rejected, U.S. paper further demonstrates extreme difficulty creating long-term inspection system which will at same time (a) ensure against reintroduction offensive weapons into Cuba, (b) provide sufficient element of reciprocity to obtain Cuban acceptance, (c) not involve excessive inspection other Caribbean countries including United States, (d) not offer long-term protection to Castro greater than that promised in President's letter to Khrushchev, and (e) not involve undue external non-aligned involvement in Western Hemisphere.

TAny UN presence in Cuba comparable to those in Korea, Greece and Gaza Strip could be used as they were to protect regime against infiltration, guerrilla activities, sabotage, etc., as well as against actual invasion. At same time, UN observation group with mandate to investigate invasion

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in New York and inspection limited to minimum would considerably reduce safeguards but would also reduce protection to Castro and scope and frequency inspections elsewhere in Caribbean. Essentially such system might provide for limited investigation every three months of (1) allegations concerning offensive weapons in Cuba and (2) allegations of invasion preparations in Caribbean, including Cuba.

On the whole, however, we are inclined to believe any feasible reciprocal inspection system has far more serious disadvantages than advantages. If Department reaches same conclusion, we should promptly so inform the Secretary General as he is strongly inclined toward pushing ahead with such system and injecting non-aligned states into Caribbean situation.

Regardless our decision on such system, we may wish for tactical reasons submit to Soviets proposal for inspection concerned solely with non-reintroduction offensive weapons in Cuba, emphasizing that safeguards relating to this question are only long-term safeguards envisaged in President-Khrushchev correspondence. We would expect such proposal would be rejected by Soviets or Cubans but we would be in position of having submitted concrete proposal based on exchange of letters. We are preparing draft along these lines.

IO - Harlan Cleveland

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the IL-28's promptly, without tying this removal to a series of unsatisfactory conditions as has been the case up to now. If such an assurance should be forthcoming, I will be able to take a relatively conciliatory tone in the press conference, with respect to the Soviet Union, to announce that the quarantine can now be lifted, and concentrate attention upon the total refusal of the Cuban Government to accept any arrangements for on-site inspection and verification, as well as on the danger presented by Cuban threats to fire on our surveillance aircraft.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Government does not make appropriate assurances on the IL-28's between now and tomorrow afternoon, it will be necessary to focus attention upon this Soviet failure to carry out an important part of the understanding. In that case I expect to announce that a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States is being called this week so that we can make a full report on the measures taken under the Resolution of October 23rd, which authorized all appropriate action, including the use of armed force.

Meanwhile, we are considering further actions, which may involve response from the air to any attack on our surveillance, or a reimposition and extension of the naval quarantine, or perhaps both in combination. The logical way of extending the quarantine would be to add oil products to the list of prohibited items, ~~etc~~ since these are

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directly related to the operation of bombers.

We have a variety of instruments of pressure available, and the over-all situation is somewhat less dangerous than it was in October because Soviet missiles are no longer operational in Cuba. On the other hand, we have to face the fact that a second backdown for Khrushchev may be harder in some ways than the first. For this and other reasons we see some advantages in concentrating any action we may take on Castro, from now on, if it can be managed. But the Soviets say that the IL-28's are still under their control, and until they are removed we have very little choice but to apply at least a part of our pressure against direct Soviet interests. Our thinking is further affected by new evidence that Soviet forces in Cuba are considerably stronger than we earlier estimated. We have identified elements of four Soviet ground combat units, with a total strength of perhaps 3,000 men, and the whole Soviet military presence in Cuba may be on the order of 12 to 16 thousand men. We are making it clear to the Soviets that no real normalization of relations is possible while a Soviet military presence of this sort continues.

I expect to indicate clearly Tuesday that renewed action will be required very soon unless (1) the IL-28's begin to leave, and (2) our surveillance continues without challenge from Castro, pending the establishment of better safeguards. Our precise choices among the

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numerous courses of action available to us will evidently be affected by what the Soviets and Cubans actually do.

In this general situation, while we believe that the main responsibility necessarily falls on us, we naturally value very highly the firm support which you and our other major allies have given. If we have to go forward again, your continued support will be of the greatest importance, and meanwhile I shall be very glad to have the benefit of your own thoughts on this problem. END TEXT

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